



# **Protection of Personally Identifiable Information through Disclosure Avoidance Techniques**

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# Presentation Overview

- Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)
- Disclosure Avoidance Primer
- ED's History with Disclosure Avoidance
- ED's Current Thinking
- Moving Forward
- Questions and Discussion



# **Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)**



Definitions and Requirements



# Confidentiality under FERPA

- Protects personally identifiable information (PII) from education records from unauthorized disclosure
- Requirement for written consent before sharing PII
- Exceptions from the consent requirement for:
  - “Studies”
  - “Audits and Evaluations”
  - Health and Safety emergencies
  - And others purposes as specified in §99.31



# Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

- Name
- Name of parents or other family members
- Address
- Personal identifier (e.g., SSN, Student ID#)
- Other indirect identifiers (e.g., date or place of birth)
- *“Other information that, alone or in combination, is linked or linkable to a specific student that would allow a reasonable person in the school community, who does not have personal knowledge of the relevant circumstances, to identify the student with reasonable certainty.” (34 CFR § 99.3)*




# Reporting vs. Privacy

- Department of Education regulations require reporting on a number of issues, often broken down across numerous sub-groups, including:
  - Gender
  - Race/Ethnicity
  - Disability Status
  - Limited English Proficiency
  - Migrant Status
  - Economically Disadvantaged Students
- BUT, slicing the data this many ways increases the risks of disclosure, and the regulations also require states to *“implement appropriate strategies to protect the privacy of individual students...”* (§200.7)



# How States are Doing It





# Example: School Performance Data Sunshine Elementary 3<sup>rd</sup> Grade Class (Anywhere, U.S.A.)

	# Tested	Basic (and above)	Proficient (and above)	Advanced
Male	37	100%	59%	5%
Female	38	92%	66%	11%
AIAN	1	*	*	*
Black	37	92%	43%	5%
Hispanic	12	100%	75%	8%
Asian	4	*	*	*
White	21	100%	81%	5%
All Students	75	96%	63%	8%



# Example: School Performance Data Sunshine Elementary 3<sup>rd</sup> Grade Class (Anywhere, U.S.A.)

	# Tested	Basic (and above)	Proficient (and above)	Advanced
Male	37	(37) 100%	(22) 59%	(2) 5%
Female	38	(35) 92%	(25) 66%	(4) 11%
AIAN	1	*	*	*
Black	37	(34) 92%	(16) 43%	(2) 5%
Hispanic	12	(12) 100%	(9) 75%	(1) 8%
Asian	4	*	*	*
White	21	(21) 100%	(17) 81%	(1) 5%
All Students	75	(72) 96%	(47) 63%	(6) 8%

For each subgroup (row) multiply the percent by the # Tested to get the number of students in that category



# Example: School Performance Data Sunshine Elementary 3<sup>rd</sup> Grade Class (Anywhere, U.S.A.)

	# Tested	Basic (and above)	Proficient (and above)	Advanced
Male	37	(37) 100%	(22) 59%	(2) 5%
Female	38	(35) 92%	(25) 66%	(4) 11%
AIAN	1	(1) *	(1) *	(0-1) *
Black	37	(34) 92%	(16) 43%	(2) 5%
Hispanic	12	(12) 100%	(9) 75%	(1) 8%
Asian	4	(4) *	(4) *	(1-2) *
White	21	(21) 100%	(17) 81%	(1) 5%
All Students	75	(72) 96%	(47) 63%	(6) 8%

Calculate the suppressed subgroups by subtracting the remaining subgroup totals from the “All Students” totals



# Example: School Performance Data Sunshine Elementary 3<sup>rd</sup> Grade Class (Anywhere, U.S.A.)

	# Tested	Below Basic	Basic (and above)	Proficient (and above)	Advanced
Male	37	0	(37) 100%	(22) 59%	(2) 5%
Female	38	3	(35) 92%	(25) 66%	(4) 11%
AIAN	1	0	(1) *	(1) *	(0-1) *
Black	37	3	(34) 92%	(16) 43%	(2) 5%
Hispanic	12	0	(12) 100%	(9) 75%	(1) 8%
Asian	4	0	(4) *	(4) *	(1-2) *
White	21	0	(21) 100%	(17) 81%	(1) 5%
All Students	75	3	(72) 96%	(47) 63%	(6) 8%

Calculate the unreported outcome by subtracting the "Good" totals from the # Tested



# But what is a disclosure anyway?





# Disclosure Avoidance Primer



(aren't you glad you had coffee this morning?)



# It's all about risk



“The release of any data usually entails at least some element of risk. A decision to eliminate all risk of disclosure would curtail [data] releases drastically, if not completely. Thus, for any proposed release of [data] the acceptability of the level of risk of disclosure must be evaluated.”

Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology, “Statistical Working Paper #2”



# 3 Basic Flavors of Disclosure Avoidance

- Suppression
- Blurring
- Perturbation



# Suppression

## Definition:

Removing data to prevent the identification of individuals in small cells or with unique characteristics

## Examples:

- Cell Suppression
- Row Suppression
- Sampling

## Effect on Data Utility:

- Results in very little data being produced for small populations
- Requires suppression of additional, non-sensitive data (e.g., complementary suppression)

## Residual Risk of Disclosure:

- Suppression can be difficult to perform correctly (especially for large multi-dimensional tables)
- If additional data is available elsewhere, the suppressed data may be re-calculated.



# Blurring

## **Definition:**

Reducing the precision of data that is presented to reduce the certainty of identification.

## **Examples:**

- Aggregation
- Percents
- Ranges
- Top/Bottom-Coding
- Rounding

## **Effect on Data Utility:**

- Users cannot make inferences about small changes in the data
- Reduces the ability to perform time-series or cross-case analysis

## **Residual Risk of Disclosure:**

- Generally low risk, but if row/column totals are published (or available elsewhere) then it may be possible to calculate the actual values of sensitive cells



# Perturbation

## Definition:

Making small changes to the data to prevent identification of individuals from unique or rare characteristics

## Examples:

- Data Swapping
- Noise
- Synthetic Data
- Can minimize loss of utility compared to other methods
- Seen as inappropriate for program data because it reduces the transparency and credibility of the data, which can have enforcement and regulatory implications
- If someone has access to some (e.g., a single state's) original data, they may be able to reverse-engineer the perturbation rules used to alter the rest of the data

## Effect on Data Utility:

## Residual Risk of Disclosure:



# **The U.S. Department of Education's History with Disclosure Avoidance**



How we got where we are today...



# Recent Developments in Disclosure Avoidance at ED

- State Workbooks
- School and LEA level data
- Reactions from the field
- Technical Brief 3



# **ED's Current Thinking on Disclosure Avoidance**



Emerging (but still unofficial) views  
taking shape at ED



# Emerging Views

- Perturbation and transparency
- Non-Trivial distinction between 0s and 1s
- Exceptions for publishing 100% in certain cases
- Who is a “reasonable person in the school community?”



# Moving Forward?



Where do we go from here?



# Moving Forward

- Data Release Working Group
- (Proposed) Formation of a Disclosure Review Board
- Guidance for the field

Our Goal: Publish as much usable data as we can AND protect privacy



# Questions and Discussion

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